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SURVEY OF IN-HOUSE TAX DEPARTMENTS IN UNITED KINGDOM
CORPORATES
ABSTRACT
Managing cash tax liabilities to gain maximum financial advantage should be a key
corporate objective.  However, this involves satisfying simultaneously the divergent, and
increasingly demanding, requirements of tax compliance and tax planning work.  It also
raises questions as to how companies should organise their tax work. Benchmarks are a
useful aid in answering such questions.
In order to facilitate establishing some benchmarks, information was sought from 434 major
UK-based and inward investor corporates.  Of the 156 (36%) useable responses, 134 (86%)
were from organisations with in-house tax departments and 22 (14%) from those without.
The responding companies represented all of the major industrial sectors and varied widely
in size and profitability.  In 1995 they paid a total of £8 billion in UK corporation tax and £6
billion in overseas tax.
The survey results provide information about, inter alia, the incidence of in-house tax
departments in major UK corporates; reasons for their establishment/non-establishment; the
amount, cost and type of tax work performed by in-house and shadow tax departments and by
external experts; the hardware and software used in in-house tax departments; and the
potential for, attitudes to, and use made of positive tax planning techniques.  The survey also
identified ways - particularly in relation to information technology and the allocation of tax
work between in-house and shadow tax departments - where the efficiency and effectiveness
of corporate tax functions could be improved.
1INTRODUCTION
Shareholder value analysis is the single most useful technique for valuing and appraising a
company.  This was the finding of a survey of senior equity investment analysts in 52 of the
largest fund management organisations in the United Kingdom (UK) (Plasschaert, 1994).  The
survey also found that one of the most important drivers of shareholder value is a company’s
cash tax rate (that is, tax paid compared to accounting profit as distinct from accounts tax
charge compared to accounting profit).  It follows from the survey’s findings that managing
cash tax liabilities to gain maximum financial advantage should be a key corporate objective.
However, this presents a major challenge to corporate tax managers as managing cash tax
liabilities has two major divergent components, namely, (i) ensuring that the company’s
compliance work is performed effectively but at minimum cost (compliance component) and
(ii) ensuring that the company’s affairs are arranged in such a way, within the existing
legislation, as to secure the minimum levels of tax payment (planning - or value-added -
component).
Not only are these components divergent, they are each gaining in significance as governments
around the world seek to increase their tax revenue and decrease their collection costs.  The
burden of tax compliance costs is increasing as tax legislation (world-wide) increases in
complexity and requires taxpayers to provide more information1.  At the same time, as the
revenue-raising net of governments is spread more widely and companies’ (potential) tax
liabilities are correspondingly expanded, so directors are motivated to seek ways to arrange
their companies’ affairs so as to exploit every legitimate opportunity to reduce their
companies’ tax burden.
2Given the need to satisfy simultaneously tax compliance and tax advisory requirements, the
question arises as to how a company should organise its tax work.  For example, should it
establish an in-house tax department2 and, if so, should this department perform both the
company’s tax compliance and its tax advisory work? Is it more efficient for the compliance
work to be undertaken by - say - the accounting function or even be outsourced?  Should
outside experts be employed to fulfill part or all of the advisory role?  Do the answers to these
and similar questions vary with the size, industry sector and/or multinational/national nature of
the organisation?
Benchmarks3 are a useful aid in formulating answers to such questions, and also for enabling
tax managers to evaluate and improve their performance.  However, in order to establish
benchmarks, information on current practice is needed.  In 1995, Price Waterhouse (1995)
surveyed 50 major UK corporates [including 33 from the Financial Times (FT) Top 100
companies] with a view to collecting data to facilitate establishing some initial benchmarks for
tax functions - and in-house tax departments in particular.  As an outcome of that survey, a
need for further information in respect of five key topics relating to the tax functions of major
UK corporates was identified, namely:
i) the tax work performed by in-house and/or ‘shadow’ tax departments and/or by outside
experts;
ii) factors encouraging/discouraging the establishment of in-house tax departments;
iii) the costs of maintaining in-house tax departments;
iv) the use of information technology by in-house tax departments;
v) attitudes to, and use made of, positive tax planning techniques.
In response to the identified need for information in these areas, in 1996 Price Waterhouse
3commissioned Cranfield School of Management to conduct a further survey.  This paper
reports the methodology and results of the 1996 survey.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to ensure that sufficient information was gathered to enable reliable benchmarks to be
established, and also to facilitate a comparison between UK-based and inward investor
corporates, the 1996 survey included a larger and broader sample of companies than the 1995
survey.  The survey sample included the largest 242 companies (by market capitalisation) in the
FT Top 500 companies (FT cos) and the largest 192 companies quoted in Jordan’s (1996)
listing of inward investors (IIs)4.  As is shown in Figure 1, 156 usable responses were received
(an overall usable response rate of 36%).  Of the 156 responding companies, 134 (86%) had in-
house tax departments (104 of the FT cos and 30 of the IIs) and 22 did not (6 FT cos5  and 16
IIs).
Figure 1: Groups included in the survey and their response rates
Survey Group
No. in
Survey
Blank or
unusable
responses
No
Response
Usable
Responses
No.      %
In-house tax
department
Yes      No
FT Companies 242 77 55 110 45 104 6
Inward Investors 192 48 98 46 24 30 16
Total No.
%
434
100
125
29
153
35
156
36
134
86
22
14
The tax managers6 of the survey companies received a questionnaire containing five sections.7
These were as follows:
1. The first section sought general information about the company - its industrial sector,
size, reportable geographical sectors, tax payments, and the importance accorded to
tax matters by the company’s board of directors.
42. The second section applied only to companies with in-house tax departments.  The tax
managers of these companies were asked to provide information about:
- the perceived advantages and disadvantages of establishing in-house tax
departments;
- the reportable geographical sectors (including the UK) in which the company had
an in-house tax department and the tax work performed by these departments;
- the tax work performed in the UK by departments other than the in-house tax
department (that is, by shadow tax departments);
- the estimated cost of, and tax work performed by, outside experts employed in
the UK and in other reportable geographical sectors;
- the costs of maintaining in-house tax department(s) in the UK;
- evaluation of the in-house tax department’s performance;
- whether or not the in-house tax department should be expanded - and reasons
therefor;
- satisfaction (or otherwise) with work performed by outside experts;
- information technology used by the company’s in-house tax department(s) in the
UK.
3. Section three applied only to companies without in-house tax departments.  The person
responsible for tax matters in these companies was asked to indicate:
- whether their company had considered establishing an in-house tax department;
- the importance of factors encouraging or discouraging the establishment of such
departments;
- the tax work performed in the UK by various departments within the
organisation;
5- the estimated cost of, and tax work performed by, outside experts employed in
the UK and in other reportable geographical sectors;
- satisfaction (or otherwise) with work performed by these experts.
4. Section four, which all respondents were asked to complete, sought information
regarding the company’s potential for, attitude to, and use made of, positive tax
planning techniques.
5. In the final section, respondents were asked to indicate any changes in the performance
of tax work in their organisation they anticipated would occur within the following 12
months.  They were also invited to add any further comments they wished in relation to
the survey or to in-house tax departments in general.
The survey instrument was pilot-tested amongst six representatives of the survey sample -
including both FT cos and IIs and companies with and without in-house tax departments.  As a
result of comments received the questionnaire underwent minor amendment, primarily to
eliminate ambiguities in some of the questions asked.  The questionnaire was mailed in July
1996 and was followed up by two further mailings to non-respondents in August and
September 1996.  As noted above, a usable response rate of 36% was achieved.  Although this
rate is relatively high for surveys of this type in the UK, it leaves open the possibility of non-
response bias.  However, as the responses received from the second and third mailings did not
differ significantly from each other or from those received from the initial mailing, it seems
reasonable to assume that the results obtained are generally representative of the population
from which the survey sample was drawn.
The questionnaire data was collated and tested using SPSS.  Pearson’s r statistic was used to
test for correlation between the presence/absence of an in-house tax department and company
variables such as size and industrial sector; the Mann-Whitney test was used to test the
6significance of differences in the responses from the FT cos compared with those from the IIs,
and between the responses from companies with and those without in-house tax departments.
In each case a significance level of 0.05 was adopted.
PROFILE OF PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
As may be seen from Figure 2, the survey included companies from all of the major industrial
sectors and covered a wide range of company sizes and profitability levels. Compared with the
FT cos, the IIs had greater representation in the financial services sector but less in the
manufacturing, retail and distribution, and utilities and media sectors.  The  IIs also tended to
be smaller than the FT cos - about 46% of the IIs reported turnover and total assets of less
than £500 million compared with about 15% of the FT cos; similarly, while 68% of the IIs
reported either losses or profits of less than £100 million, only 29% of the FT cos did so.
Figure 2 also shows that the survey companies with in-house tax departments had greater
representation in the manufacturing, utilities and media, and primary industries sectors than
those without in-house tax departments but the latter were more represented  in the retail and
distribution and leisure sectors.  Notwithstanding these observations, there is no discernible
correlation between the presence/absence of an in-house tax department and a company’s
industrial sector (r = .03, p = .72).  However, this does not apply to the presence/absence of
an in-house tax department and company size.  As Figure 2 indicates, larger companies are
much more likely to have an in-house tax department than smaller companies.  The factors are
Figure 2: Industrial sectors, size and profitability of respondent companies
Total FT Cos Inward Investors
Tax Dept1 Tax Dept1 Tax Dept1
All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
No. in respondent group 156 134 22 110 104 6 46 30 16
7Industrial Sectors % % % % % % % % %
Manufacturing 25 26 19 28 28 33 18 20 13
Retail and Distribution 23 19 38 24 22 50 18 10 33
Financial Services 19 19 19 13 14 0 33 37 27
Utilities and Media 19 21 10 21 22 0 15 17 13
Primary Industries2 5 6 0 5 5 0 7 10 0
Leisure 5 5 14 5 5 17 7 3 13
Property and Construction 4 4 0 5 4 0 2 3 0
Size - Turnover
ó £200 million 13 6 50 6 6 0 30 7 69
£201-500 million 11 9 27 9 6 50 17 17 19
£501 million - £1 billion 13 12 18 13 13 33 11 10 13
£1-2 billion 17 19 0 19 20 0 11 17 0
£2-5 billion 23 26 5 29 29 17 11 17 0
> $5 billion 23 27 0 25 26 0 20 31 0
Size - Total Assets
ó £200 million 15 6 64 5 4 17 37 10 81
£201-500 million 11 8 27 11 7 0 9 10 6
£501 million-£1 billion 19 21 5 21 22 83 13 17 6
£1-2 billion 15 18 5 16 18 0 13 17 6
£2-5 billion 18 21 0 23 24 0 7 10 0
>£5 billion 23 27 0 24 25 0 22 35 0
Size - Profits (Loss)
(Losses) 7 6 5 6 5 0 9 11 6
ó £100 million profit 33 23 91 23 20 83 59 37 94
£100-£200 million profit 19 22 5 23 25 17 7 11 0
£201-£500 million profit 19 23 0 22 24 0 11 19 0
£501 million-£1 billion profit 12 14 0 16 17 0 2 4 0
>£1 billion profit 10 12 0 10 10 0 12 18 0
1. In-house tax department
2. Includes mining and oil
correlated whether size is measured by turnover (r = .37, p = .000) or by total assets (r = .40,
p = .000) and applies to both the FT cos and IIs.
The respondent companies are mostly multinational: 69% have reportable geographical sectors
outside the UK - primarily in the USA, Europe and the Far East.  The importance of overseas
interests is also reflected in the overseas tax paid by the companies - a little more than £6.0
billion (FT cos £4.5 billion and IIs £1.5 billion).  They also paid a total of just over £8.0 billion
(FT cos £7.3 billion and IIs £0.76 billion) in UK tax.  This represents about 45% of the total
corporation tax paid in the UK in 1995 (Board of the Inland Revenue, 1996) and demonstrates
the importance of the respondent companies in the UK tax arena.
8As regards the importance of tax matters within the survey companies, 81% of the tax
managers (85% of those in FT cos and 74% in IIs) reported that, in their opinion, tax
considerations have ‘some’ or a ‘major’ effect on their Board of Directors’ business decisions.
However, only 56% (62% in FT cos and 43% in IIs) believe that their company’s directors
accord ‘considerable’ or ‘very great’ importance to minimising tax liabilities.
PERFORMANCE OF TAX WORK
In any organisation tax work may be performed by an in-house tax department and/or by one
or more shadow tax department(s) (that is, tax work undertaken in accounts, personnel, legal
or other departments) and/or by outside experts.  As noted above, 134 of the 156 (86%)
respondent companies had in-house tax departments.  Of those without such departments, two
tax managers (one each from an FT co and an II) reported that their companies planned to
establish an in-house tax department within the next three years; a further 12 (two from FT
cos, 10 from IIs) signified that their companies had considered but decided against establishing
such a department.
Respondents (whether or not their organisation had an in-house tax department) were asked to
indicate the relative importance of various factors in encouraging or discouraging the
establishment of an in-house tax department.  They were asked to signify their answers on a 4
point scale ranging from 1 ‘not important’ to 4 ‘very important’.  Thus, the closer the mean of
a survey group’s responses to 4.0 the more important the group considered the factor to be:
conversely, the closer the mean is to 1.0, the less important the group adjudged the factor.
9Although moving from an assessment of ‘important’ to ‘unimportant is clearly a gradual
process, for the purposes of the survey, 2.0 has been taken as the point of separation.
From Figure 3 it may be seen that each of the respondent groups considered all four of the
‘encouraging factors’ to be important (the means of their responses all exceed the
important/not important cut-off by a significant margin).  However, as might be expected, the
respondents from companies with in-house tax departments were more agreed as to the
factors’ importance than were those from companies without such departments (the means of
their responses are higher than those from companies without in-house tax departments).  As
regards the relative importance of the factors, the tax managers of the FT cos considered
reducing the company’s tax liabilities to be the most important: to the IIs’ tax managers this
was one of the two least important factors.  For the latter group, in-house tax departments
being more cost effective than the alternatives was the factor of prime importance.  The
disparity in the importance attributed to reducing tax liabilities by the FT cos’ and IIs’ tax
managers is consistent with these managers’ assessment (noted earlier) of the importance
accorded this matter by their company’s directors (62% of the FT cos’ respondents believed
their company’s directors place ‘considerable’ or greater importance on reducing tax liabilities
compared with 43% of the II’s respondents).
Figure 3: Reasons for establishing/not establishing in-house tax departments
Total FT cos Inward Investors
No. of respondents in group 156 110 46
Has an in-house tax department in UK 86% 95% 65%
Tax Dept Tax Dept Tax Dept
Factors encouraging establishment of All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
in-house tax departments mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1 mean1
Reduces company’s tax liabilities 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8
More cost effective than alternatives 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.0
Increases tax expertise in company 3.0 3.1 2.5 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.9 3.1 2.6
Reduces risk of non-compliance 3.0 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.1 2.5 3.0 3.1 2.7
Factors discouraging establishment of
in-house tax departments
Tax issues too complex for in-house 2.0 1.9 3.0 1.9 1.8 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.9
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staff
More efficient to purchase required
tax expertise
2.0 1.9 3.0 1.9 1.9 3.2 2.2 1.8 3.0
Insufficient work to justify an in-
house tax department
1.9 1.7 3.2 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.3 1.5 3.5
1 The closer the mean is to 4.0, the more important respondents considered the factor to be; the closer the mean is to
1.0, the less important respondents adjudged the factor.
Regarding the ‘discouraging factors’, Figure 3 reveals that each of the factors was adjudged to
be of importance by respondents from companies without in-house tax departments but not so
by those from companies with in-house tax departments.  As for the ‘encouraging factors’, this
result is as might be expected.  However, the disparity in the importance accorded the factor
‘insufficient work to justify establishing an in-house tax department’ by the tax managers from
IIs without in-house tax departments compared to their FT cos counterparts was not expected.
To the IIs’ tax managers this factor is of considerable importance (their responses have a mean
of 3.5) but to the FT cos’ managers it is the least important factor (their responses mean is
2.5).  To the latter group, the main reason for not establishing an in-house tax department is
the greater efficiency of buying in tax expertise as and when required.  It is postulated that the
disparity attaching to the “insufficient work” factor may be traced, at least in part, to the size
of the IIs compared to that of the FT cos.  As noted earlier (and shown in Figure 2) the IIs
tend to be smaller than the FT cos and, as a consequence - to the extent that tax work is a
factor of size - they have less tax work to do.  Support for this proposition is provided by the
results of tests for correlation between company size and the responses of tax managers from
companies without in-house tax departments to the “insufficient work” factor (based on
turnover, r = -.53, p = .01; based on total assets, r = -.42, p = .05).  However, it is probable
that the nature of the IIs compared to the FT cos is also a contributing factor.  The IIs (as
such) have parent companies (or head offices) outside the UK and it seems likely that some of
the tax work (particularly the non-compliance component) is performed in the ‘head office’ -
thus leaving less work to be completed in the UK.
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Once an in-house tax department is established, it might be expected that its performance
would be evaluated regularly.  Yet, as Figure 4 shows, about 9% of these departments are
never evaluated and a further 4% are evaluated bi-annually (10% in each case for the IIs).
Nevertheless, about 91% of the FT cos’ and 79% of the IIs’ in-house tax departments are
evaluated once or more times a year.
Figure 4: Evaluating the performance of in-house tax departments
Total FT cos IIs
No. of respondents in group 134 104 30
Frequency of performance evaluation %1 %1 %1
Monthly, quarterly or half-yearly 21 22   9
Half-yearly 14 11 17
Annually 64 58 53
Bi-annually   4   1 10
Never   9   8 10
Importance of factors in performance evaluation mean2 mean2 mean2
‘No surprises’ 3.5 3.5 3.2
Achieving tax savings 3.4 3.4 3.3
Accounts tax rate 3.3 3.4 2.8
Achieving set objectives 3.2 3.1 3.3
Compliance work up to date 3.1 3.1 3.1
Minimising tax penalties 3.1 3.1 3.0
Cash tax paid 2.7 2.9 2.3
Adherence to budgeted costs 2.7 2.7 2.7
1 % of respondents in group responding to the question.
2 The closer the mean is to 4.0, the more important respondents considered the factor to be; the closer the mean is to
1.0, the less important respondents adjudged the factor.
In relation to evaluating in-house tax departments’ performance, respondents were asked to
indicate (on a 4 point scale) the relative importance of various factors in the evaluation.  As
may be seen from Figure 4, the two most important factors overall are ‘no surprises’ and
‘achieving tax savings’.  (These were considered to be of particular importance by FT cos’ tax
managers).  Given the importance of reducing tax liabilities as a reason for establishing in-
house tax departments (noted above), the importance of ‘achieving tax savings’ in the
departments’ performance evaluation is not unexpected.  However, the relative importance of
the ‘accounts tax rate’ (particularly in the FT cos) and the relative unimportance of ‘cash tax
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paid’ (particularly in the IIs) in the evaluation process is somewhat surprising.  Given the
significance of the cash tax rate to shareholder value and given the correlation between the
accounts tax rate and pre-tax profit (and, hence, its susceptibility to discretionary factors such
as choice of accounting policies), the ranking of the accounts and cash tax rates might have
been expected to be reversed.  A possible explanation for the relative lack of importance of the
cash tax rate in evaluating the IIs’ in-house tax departments may be found by considering this
factor in conjunction with the relatively high level of importance placed on achieving set
objectives and ensuring that compliance work is up to date, and taking due cognisance of the
size and nature of the IIs.  As noted earlier, these companies tend to be smaller than the FT
cos and (as IIs) their parent companies (or head offices) are outside the UK (primarily in the
USA).  It is possible that much of the tax planning work is performed in the company’s ‘head
office’ in-house tax department and that emphasis in the UK is on compliance work and
meeting set objectives.
As part of the survey tax managers from companies with in-house tax departments were asked
to indicate whether their organisation’s department should be expanded and to give reasons
for their answer.  Forty four respondents (36%) answered in the affirmative (34% of those
from FT cos, 45% from IIs) and 78 respondents (64%) in the negative (66% and 55%,
respectively, of respondents from the FT cos and IIs).  The four main reasons cited in favour
of expanding the in-house tax department were:
i) to exploit further tax savings opportunities (cited by 11 respondents: 8 from FT cos,
3 from IIs);
ii) to increase control over the company’s tax affairs (8 respondents: 6 from FT cos, 2
from IIs);
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iii) the expertise currently available is underutilised (7 respondents: 5 from FT cos, 2
from IIs);
iv) to reduce the need to buy in tax expertise (5 respondents: 2 from FT cos, 3 from IIs).
The main reasons provided by respondents who answered in the negative were:
i) the in-house tax department already deals with all tax related issues (26 respondents:
22 from FT cos, 4 from IIs);
ii) the tax team should concentrate on technical issues; routine compliance work should
be devolved to other areas of the organisation (20 respondents: 19 from FT cos, 1
from an II);
iii) the current balance between in-house and external expertise is satisfactory (5
respondents: 4 from FT cos, 1 from an II).
Regarding the amount of tax work undertaken by in-house and shadow tax departments,
Figure 5 indicates that more tax work is performed by in-house tax departments in the FT cos
than in the IIs; while 64% of in-house tax departments in the FT cos spend between 3 and 10
man years on tax work, 62% of those in the IIs spend between 1 and 5 man years in this way.
This difference may be the result of the IIs tending to be smaller than the FT cos (noted
earlier).  Nevertheless, it is surprising that in both the FT cos and IIs more tax work tends to
Figure 5: Performance of tax work by in-house tax departments
All FT Cos IIs
No. of respondents in group 134 104 30
Time devoted to tax work in UK %1 %1 %1
<1 man year 0 0 0
1-2 man years 26 21 41
3-5 man years 34 39 21
6-10 man years 26 25 28
>10 man years 14 15 10
Average % of total tax work time in UK
devoted to:
%1 %1 %1
Corporate income tax - national 30 31 27
- foreign   3   2   5
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Indirect taxes - national 13 13 12
- foreign   1   1   1
Stamp and capital taxes   1   1   2
Payroll and employer taxes   7   6   9
Planning transactions - national 14 15 12
- foreign   8   8   7
Planning reorganisations   6   5   8
General tax advice 10 10 11
Calculating annual tax charge   6   7   4
Industry specific taxes   1   1   2
1 % of respondents in group responding to the question..
be performed by shadow tax departments in companies with in-house tax departments than in
those without.  Intuitively, the reverse situation might be expected to apply.  As may be seen
from Figure 6a, although in some 60% of companies with an in-house tax department less than
one man year is spent on tax work in shadow tax departments, in 21% of such companies
more than 3 man years is spent on tax work in these departments.  This compares with about
97% of companies without an in-house tax department in which one to two man years is spent
on tax work in shadow tax departments.
Considering the relative importance of the various types of tax work performed in the FT cos
and IIs by in-house tax departments, shadow tax departments and external experts, Figures 5
and 6 show that, overall, there is little significant difference between the two survey groups.
The in-house tax departments of both the FT cos and IIs devote about 33% of their tax effort
to corporate income tax (national and foreign) and a further 22% to indirect taxes (national
and foreign).  This work is essentially compliance in nature - as is stamp and capital taxes,
payroll and employer taxes, and calculating the annual tax charge.  Thus, some 61% of in-
house tax department time is devoted to compliance work.  This compares with about 38% of
time spent on tax planning and advisory (value adding) activities (see Figure 5).  Given the
routine nature of much of the compliance work it would seem that the value of in-house tax
departments could be increased if some (or most) of the compliance work was devolved to
15
shadow tax departments and more in-house tax department time was spent on tax planning
and advisory work.
As Figure 6a shows, the tax work of shadow tax departments in all of the survey groups is
dominated by payroll and employer taxes.  In many cases, 100% of time spent by personnel
departments on tax work is devoted to these taxes and, overall, they account for about 43% of
shadow tax department tax work time.  The next most significant taxes in terms of shadow tax
department time are corporate income tax-national, and indirect taxes-national.  In each case,
this work accounts for about 18% of shadow tax department time in the FT cos and 14% in
the IIs.  The importance of these and other taxes involving compliance work in shadow tax
departments is to be expected.
Once a company has established an in-house tax department it might be expected that the tax
planning and advisory work would be concentrated in this department and that the shadow tax
departments would be primarily concerned with compliance work.  This is reflected in the
proportions of time spent on planning and advisory activities by shadow tax departments in
companies with, as compared to those without, in-house tax departments.  In FT cos with in-
Figure 6: Performance of tax work in shadow tax departments and by external experts
Total FT cos Inward Investors
Tax Dept Tax Dept Tax Dept
All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
No. of respondents in group 156 134 22 110 104 6 46 30 16
a) SHADOW TAX DEPARTMENTS %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1 %1
Time devoted to tax work in UK
<1 man year 49 60 0 53 56 0 44 69 0
1-2 man years 33 20 97 28 24 100 41 9 96
3-5 man years 9 10 0 10 10 0 7 11 0
6-10 man years 5 6 3 5 6 0 5 7 4
>10 man years 4 4 0 4 5 0 3 4 0
Average % of total tax work time in UK
devoted to:
Corporate income tax - national 17 17 16 19 19 15 14 12 16
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- foreign 1 .5 3 .5 1 1 2 0 3
Indirect taxes - national 17 19 11 18 18 19 15 22 10
- foreign 1 1 1 .5 .5 0 1 2 1
Stamp and capital taxes 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Payroll and employer taxes 43 44 39 43 43 40 42 45 39
Planning transactions - national 3 1 10 2 1 8 6 1 10
- foreign 2 .5 6 .5 0 4 4 1 6
Planning reorganisations 1 .5 2 .5 .5 3 1 0 2
General tax advice 3 3 5 2 2 6 5 5 5
Calculating annual tax charge 5 5.5 6 5 6 3 6 4 7
Industry specific taxes 6 8 0 8 8 0 4 8 0
b) EXTERNAL EXPERTS
Average % of total tax work time in UK
devoted to:
Corporate income tax - national 15 12 32 12 11 37 22 16 31
- foreign 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 5 3
Indirect taxes - national 7 7 6 7 7 10 7 8 5
- foreign 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 0
Stamp and capital taxes 0 .5 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Payroll and employer taxes 6 6 5 5 5 9 8 11 4
Planning transactions - national 27 30 14 31 32 8 20 23 16
- foreign 12 12 8 13 14 5 8 8 8
Planning reorganisations 10 11 2 10 10 2 10 14 3
General tax advice 14 14 13 15 15 11 11 10 13
Calculating annual charge 4 2 14 2 2 8 7 2 16
Industry specific taxes 1 1.5 1 2 1 2 1 1 0
1.  % of respondents in group responding to the question
house tax departments about 3.5% of shadow tax department time is spent on tax planning
and advisory work compared with about 21% of time in FT cos without in-house tax
departments.  (In the IIs the comparative proportions are 7% and 23%, respectively; see
Figure 6a).  However, contrary to expectations, significantly more time is devoted to
corporate income tax-national in shadow tax departments in FT cos with in-house tax
departments than in those without (19% compared to 15%).  Similarly, the shadow tax
departments of IIs with in-house tax departments spend a significantly greater proportion of
their time on indirect taxes-national (22%) than their counterparts in IIs without in-house tax
departments (10%).  The former finding may result from the smallness of the sample of FT cos
without in-house tax departments.  The latter may reflect, in part, the nature of the IIs with in-
house tax departments.  As noted earlier, 37% of the IIs with in-house tax departments are in
the financial services sector and these companies, almost certainly, encounter difficult
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problems relating to indirect taxes-national [that is, problems associated with partial
exemption from value added tax (VAT)].  These problems are likely to be handled in the
accounts, rather than in-house tax departments.  However, detailed analysis of the survey
results revealed that only about 30% of the time spent on indirect taxes-national in the shadow
tax departments of IIs with in-house tax departments is accounted for by companies in the
financial services sector - a further 35% is accounted for by companies in the utilities and
media sectors.
The relative importance of the various types of tax work performed by external experts differs
to some extent between the FT cos and IIs but varies quite markedly between companies with
and without in-house tax departments.  As may be seen from Figure 6b, the primary use of
external experts in companies with in-house tax departments is for planning transactions
(national and foreign), planning reorganisations, and general tax advice.  These activities
account for 71% and 55%, respectively, of external experts’ time in FT cos and IIs with in-
house tax departments.  This finding seems counter-intuitive.  It might be expected that if a
company has an in-house tax department, that department would include tax experts who
could perform the company’s tax planning and advisory work.  A possible explanation of the
finding is that, as the companies with in-house tax departments tend to be larger than those
without, they have more tax planning opportunities.  Further, as these companies possess their
own tax experts, they may be more aware (than those without such experts) of the advantages
to be gained from careful tax planning.
In companies without in-house tax departments, external experts are used primarily to assist
with corporate tax-national.  (This accounts for 37% and 31%, respectively, of external
experts’ time in FT cos and IIs without in-house tax departments).  It is suggested that this
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reflects the need for shadow tax departments in companies without in-house tax departments
(and tax specialists) to rely on external experts to assist them when they encounter difficulties
in complying with UK corporate income tax legislation.
As an element of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed their
organisation gets value for money when buying in tax expertise.  The tax managers of
companies with an in-house tax department were also asked to give reasons for their answer.8
Overall, 87% of respondents (77% of those from FT cos and 59% from IIs) answered in the
affirmative.  The main reasons cited for believing the organisation gets value for money from
the external experts were as follows:
i) expertise is bought in for specialist areas for which it is not cost-effective to maintain
in-house expertise (28 respondents: 19 from FT cos, 9 from IIs);
ii) tax expertise is purchased for purposes which are carefully specified (17 respondents:
16 from FT cos, 1 from an II);
iii) value for money is obtained as a result of good co-operation and communication
between the company’s tax personnel and the external experts (16 respondents: 15
from FT cos, 1 from an II).
The chief reasons provided by the respondents who considered their organisation does not get
value for money from their external experts were:
i) the lack of desire on the part of the supplier to be efficient (10 respondents: 5 from FT
cos, 5 from IIs);
ii) the relatively high cost of external tax experts compared with that for other types of
external expertise (8 respondents: 7 from FT cos, 1 from an II);
iii) the failure by the external advisors to understand the business (6 respondents: 2 from
FT cos, 4 from IIs).
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COSTS OF TAX WORK
Looking at the costs of tax work, Figure 7a shows that, on average, the cost of tax work in
the survey companies in the UK in 1995 amounted to nearly £1million:  £519,000 on
maintaining in-house tax departments (£557,000 in the FT cos and £391,000 in the IIs);
£225,000 on tax work in shadow tax departments (£233,000 in the FT cos and £209,000 in
the IIs) and £224,000 on external expertise (£224,000 and £223,000 in the FT cos and IIs,
respectively).9  The difference between the FT cos’ and IIs’ in-house and shadow tax
department costs corresponds with the greater amount of tax work effort (expressed in man
years) in both of these departments in the FT cos compared to the IIs (noted earlier).
Although the average cost of external expertise in the FT cos and IIs in 1995 was very similar,
it differed significantly between companies with and without in-house tax departments: those
with in-house tax departments spent an average of £244,00010 on external experts compared
with £113,000 spent by companies without such departments.  Intuitively, the reverse finding
might be expected.  However, the finding could be a result of differences in the type of work
Figure 7: Costs of tax work in the survey companies
7a:  Average cost of tax work in the survey companies in the UK in 1995
In-house tax depts Shadow tax depts External experts
Total FT cos IIs Total FT cos IIs Total FT cos IIs
No. in respond. group 134 104 30 156 110 46 156 110 46
£’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000
Direct costs 355 383 262 - - - - - -
Indirect costs 164 174 129 - - - - - -
Total 519 557 391 225 233 209 2241 2241 223
7b:  Analysis of indirect costs
No. in respond group
Total
134
FT Cos
104
IIs
30
%2 %2 %2
Travel expenses 21 23 18
Heat, light, rent 16 16 16
Support staff salaries 15 16 13
Books, publications,
stationery
15 13 18
Computer related 14 14 13
20
expenses
Technical training 11 11 12
Telephone, fax, courier
etc
  7   6   8
Penalty charges   1   1   2
1  Excludes single outlier of £200 million
2  % of respondents in group responding to the question.
performed by external experts in the two groups of companies.  As noted earlier, in companies
with in-house tax departments external experts are used more extensively for (more costly) tax
planning and advisory activities:  in companies without such departments, they are used mainly
for (less costly) compliance work.
The ‘direct costs’ of in-house tax departments (which are more than double the ‘indirect
costs’) are almost exclusively the remuneration of professional tax staff.  Analysis of the
‘indirect costs’, which is provided in Figure 7b, shows that approximately 67% of these costs
comprise travel expenses; heat, light and rent; support staff salaries; and books, publications
and stationery.  However, these results should be treated with caution as detailed analysis of
the responses indicates that different respondents interpreted ‘indirect costs’ in different ways.
Some included all or most of the costs shown in Figure 7b, others excluded overheads such as
heat, light and rent, and telephone, fax and courier costs.  As far as is known, other surveys of
in-house tax departments have not sought to capture data on indirect costs and further
investigation of this area is needed if reliable benchmarks are to be established.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) IN IN-HOUSE TAX DEPARTMENTS
Figure 8 indicates that the majority of respondents considered that the sophistication of the IT
in their in-house tax department is fairly similar to (but edging towards being more advanced
than) that of companies of similar size and other departments within their organisation.
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However, they adjudged their IT to be rather less advanced than that available in the market.
The survey results also indicate that IT in in-house tax departments tends to be more advanced
in the FT cos’ than in the IIs.
Regarding the survey companies’ hardware and software, 79% of the tax managers reported
that more than 75% of the computers used by their in-house tax department(s) are PCs - 486s
or pentiums.  Only 18% signified that more than 75% of their computers are PCs - 386s or
lower.  The survey also found that in-house tax departments use a wide variety of software -
for both tax computations and other purposes.  Some 18 different packages were reported as
being used for  tax  computations.   As  Figure 8  shows, the  most popular  are  Lotus  1-2-3,
Excel  and Taxsoft.  Other software used includes PowerTax, Abacus and Taxmaster. Twenty
packages were identified as being used for purposes other  than tax computations.   Twelve of
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Figure 8: IT in in-house tax departments
No. in respondent group
Total
134
FT cos
104
IIs
30
Level of IT compared with %1 %1 %1
i) companies of similar size
Significantly less advanced   2   1   7
Little less advanced 36 34 43
Little more advanced 41 43 36
Significantly more advanced 21 22 15
ii) other departments within company
Significantly less advanced
Little less advanced
5
43
2
43
14
43
Little more advanced 39 42 32
Significantly more advanced 13 13 11
iii) technology available in market
Significantly less advanced 13   8 25
Little less advanced 50 52 46
Little more advanced 31 33 25
Significantly more advanced   4   4   4
Significantly more advanced   6   6   4
Hardware and software used
i) Proportion of hardware used:
PCs 486 or pentium
ó 50% 10   8 16
51-75% 12 14   8
76-100% 79 78 76
ii) Software used for computations
Lotus 1-2-3 36 31 33
Taxsoft 33 36 13
Excel 33 32 20
In-house generated software 19 18 13
CD-Rom libraries 18 20   7
iii) Software used for other purposes
Word 49 46 33
Lotus 1-2-3 47 49 20
Excel 45 44 27
CD-Rom libraries 45 40 36
Powerpoint 28 26 18
In-house generated software 21 20 13
AmiPro 21 21 11
Assistance with IT
Less than readily available 23 17 38
Readily available 51 54 41
Very readily available 26 28 21
Collecting data for tax computations
In-house tax dept. - manual analysis 68 67 68
- networked downloading 41 42 36
Accounts dept. - manual analysis 67 65 72
- networked downloading 42 38 56
Review of tax computations
No review performed   2   0   7
Hardcopy reviewed 91 91 90
Reviewed on screen   7   8   3
Tax computations could be performed by less
technically qualified staff 22 19 30
Software is used to link general accounting
records with tax computations 13 14 10
1  % of respondents in group responding to the question
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these coincided with those used for computations but 8 (including, for example, Access,
Freelance and Croner’s VAT Guide) were reported as being used only for ‘other purposes’.
As may be seen from Figure 8, the most widely used ‘other purposes’ packages are Word,
Lotus 1-2-3, Excel and CD-Rom libraries.
It is pertinent to note that Taxsoft, PowerTax, Abacus and Taxmaster are dedicated tax
software, that is, they are designed to perform tax computations and they incorporate the
elements of tax legislation and other relevant data required to do this.  In contrast, spreadsheet
packages such as Lotus 1-2-3 and Excel need to be specially set up to perform tax
computations.  Changes in tax legislation and/or regulations may necessitate changes to the
spreadsheet and, if these are not effected by someone who has a thorough understanding of
how the spreadsheet was set up initially, errors may occur.  Given the frequency of changes in,
and the increasing complexity of, tax legislation, it appears that companies relying on
spreadsheet packages have opportunities to improve the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the
performance of their tax computations by switching to dedicated tax software.
Given the reasonably high level of sophistication of computer hardware and the wide variety of
software used in in-house tax departments, a surprising finding is that over two thirds of the
survey companies rely on manual analysis (performed in either the in-house tax department
and/or the accounts department) to collect data for tax computations.  Similarly, in only 13%
of the survey companies (14% of the FT cos and 10% of the IIs) is software used to link the
general accounting records with tax computations.  Further, in 91% of the companies (91% of
the FT cos and 90% of the IIs) tax computations are reviewed on hard copy: in only 7% of
cases (8% of the FT cos and 3% of the IIs) are they reviewed ‘on screen’.  However, possibly
24
more surprising than the small proportion of reviews conducted on screen is the finding that in
2% of the companies (all IIs) no review of tax computations is undertaken.
Asked whether staff less technically qualified than those currently performing tax
computations could be used for this task, 22% of the respondents (19% of those from FT cos
and 30% of those from IIs) answered in the affirmative.  This seems to signal an opportunity
for cost savings in the tax functions of a significant minority of major UK corporates.
From the findings related to the use of IT, it appears that avenues are available for improving
the performance of in-house tax departments in major UK corporates.  In particular, the
adoption of dedicated tax software in place of spreadsheets is likely to increase the accuracy
and/or the efficiency of performing tax computations.  Further, by applying ‘what if’ scenarios
to this software, it is probable that more tax planning opportunities could be identified and
used.  Additionally, gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of tax work could be achieved
through direct downloading of tax data from accounting to tax software.  As noted above, at
the time of the survey (1996) only 13% of the survey companies with in-house tax
departments had this facility.
POSITIVE TAX PLANNING (PTP) TECHNIQUES
For the purposes of the survey, positive tax planning (PTP) was defined to mean:
The deliberate use of techniques which may contravene the spirit but not the letter of the
law, with a view to reducing the company’s tax liabilities.  Positive tax planning is
distinguished from ‘good housekeeping’.
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The survey first sought to ascertain respondents’ potential for using PTP.  As Figure 9 shows,
some 72% of respondents reported that they had unutilised tax losses, 53% that they were
exempt or partially  exempt from VAT, 50% that  they  had  an  ACT  capacity  problem,  and
Figure 9: Positive Tax Planning (PTP)
No. of respondents in group
Total
156
FT cos
110
IIs
46
Tax planning attributes %1 %1 %1
Utilised tax losses 72 71 68
Exempt/partially exempt from VAT 53 47 61
ACT capacity problem 50 59 30
Trading losses brought forward 43 32 64
Unutilised management expenses 20 19 20
Attitudes to use of positive tax planning (PTP)
Generally against using PTP techniques 23 18 33
Use PTP techniques occasionally 50 54 40
Use PTP techniques whenever possible 28 28 28
Probability of success required before using PTP
£50% 12 13 9
51-75% 27 30 21
76-90% 48 45 56
>90% 13 13 14
Popularity of PTP techniques mean2 mean2 mean2
VAT mitigation
International restructuring
3.1 3.1 2.4
a) Use of dividend “mixer” company 2.9 3.1 1.7
b) Use of offshore finance centre 2.7 2.8 1.9
Minimising tax on sale of subsidiaries
a) Set up of base cost 2.7 3.0 1.5
b) Pre-sales dividend strip 2.7 2.9 1.7
c) “Envelope Scheme” 1.7 1.9 1.0
Selling ACT capacity 1.8 1.9 1.3
Buying ACT capacity 1.7 1.8 1.3
Buying surplus F11 1.6 1.7 1.2
Buying surplus management expenses 1.5 1.6 1.5
Selling capital losses 1.5 1.5 1.6
Buying capital losses 1.5 1.6 1.1
Selling surplus management expenses 1.4 1.4 1.4
Selling surplus F11 1.4 1.4 1.3
1 % of respondents in group responding to the question.
2 The closer the mean to 4.0 the more the technique has been considered and implemented: the closer the
mean to 1.0 the less the technique has been considered.
43% that they had trading losses brought forward.  It thus appears that, overall, the survey
companies have ample opportunity for employing PTP techniques.  However, the survey also
found that, even in circumstances where “failure would result in little downside cost” (per the
questionnaire), 61% of the respondents (58% of those from FT cos and 70% of those from
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IIs) indicated that they required a minimum probability of success of 76% before they would
employ PTP techniques.  Similarly, 23% of the respondents (18% of those from FT cos and
33% of those from IIs) reported that they would ‘never consider’ using PTP techniques or
they ‘might consider’ using them ‘in some circumstances’.
In order to ascertain which techniques are used most frequently, respondents were asked to
indicate, for each of a list of possible techniques, whether they had implemented the technique,
considered it in depth but not implemented it, considered it briefly but rejected it, or not
considered it.  By allocating numbers 4 to 1 to these four options, a mean was calculated for
each technique.  The closer the mean is to 4.0, the more it has been considered and
implemented: the closer the mean to 1.0, the less it has been considered.  The results are
presented in Figure 9.
From Figure 9 it may be seen that the most widely considered and implemented technique is
VAT mitigation followed by international restructuring techniques (use of an offshore finance
centre and/or a dividend ‘mixer’ company) and minimising tax on the sale of subsidiaries
(particularly through set up of base cost and/or pre-sale dividend strips).  In general, these
schemes were the most widely considered and implemented in both the FT cos and IIs.
However, as was reflected in the findings relating to tax managers’ attitudes to the use of PTP
and the required probability of success before employing the techniques, the means indicating
the extent of PTP adoption suggest that tax managers in the IIs are more risk averse than their
FT company counterparts.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
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In the final section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate any significant
changes relating to tax work they believed were likely to occur in their organisation in the next
12 months.  The five most commonly identified changes are shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Significant changes relating to tax work expected in the next 12 months
Expected changes Total FT Cos IIs
No. No. No.
Expansion of in-house tax department and tax work - in
particular, increased compliance work resulting from
self-assessment.  Also, broadening of responsibilities to
include treasury function.
28 16 12
Increased emphasis on (world-wide) tax planning;
maximising tax benefits; forecasting, controlling and
reducing the accounts tax rate (especially to improve
EPS) and cash tax rate.
23 18   5
Acceleration/improvement of data collection and tax
computations through increased use of IT, linking of tax
and accounting software, and training of company
personnel.
20 16   4
Reduction in size of in-house tax department as a result of
increased outsourcing of tax compliance work, increased
use of IT, and devolution of tax work (eg VAT and
PAYE) to other departments.  Also, a reduction in tax
planning activities as a result of increased tax regulation
(less opportunity for tax-reducing planning).
  8   6   2
Increased work in the areas of EU taxation, transfer
pricing, ACT mitigation, acquisitions and disposals,
joint ventures, and specialist taxes such as landfill tax.
  8   6   2
From Figure 10 it is evident that the respondents hold differing views on likely changes: some
foresee an expansion of their in-house tax department - resulting, in particular, from increased
compliance work and a general broadening of the tax function: others (albeit a smaller
number) consider that a reduction in the size of their in-house tax department is more likely as
the use of IT increases and compliance and other tax work is outsourced and/or devolved to
other departments in the company.
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Notwithstanding these opposing views, the respondents appear to be generally agreed that
greater use of IT and an increase in compliance and other tax work are likely.  It seems
probable that, as IT is increasingly employed for ‘routine’ tax work, this work can be devolved
to other departments (such as accounts and personnel) within the organisation.  This should
free up resources within in-house tax departments and enable the company’s tax specialists to
focus on tax planning (with a view to maximising tax benefits and minimising tax liabilities)
and giving general tax advice within the organisation.
CONCLUSION
Noting the importance of companies managing their cash tax liabilities to gain maximum
financial advantage, and recognising that this involves satisfying simultaneously the divergent -
and increasingly demanding - requirements of tax compliance and tax advisory and planning
work, a survey of the tax functions of some of the UK’s largest companies was conducted.
With usable responses from 156 major corporates, the survey has provided information about
the incidence of in-house tax departments in such organisations, reasons for their
establishment/non-establishment, and the frequency and basis of their performance evaluation.
It has also provided insight into the amount, cost and type of tax work performed by in-house
and shadow tax departments and by external experts in major UK companies, the hardware
and software used in their in-house tax departments, and their potential for, attitudes to, and
use made of positive tax planning techniques.  However, most importantly, the survey has
identified ways - particularly in the IT arena and in the allocation of tax work between in-
house and shadow tax departments - where the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate tax
functions could be improved.
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NOTES
1. For example, in the UK, with the move to Pay and File and Self-assessment.
2. For definition, see Appendix 1.
3. For the purposes of this paper, benchmarks are defined as convenient points of
reference, such as the average value, in the range of values reported by a number of
companies for one aspect of their size or performance.
4. The names and addresses of these companies - and, in most cases, the names of their tax
managers - were supplied to the Cranfield researchers by Price Waterhouse.
5. As a consequence of the small size of this survey group, percentages or means (as
applicable) shown for this group in Figures 2, 3 and 6 should be treated with caution.
6. The term ‘tax managers’ is used in this paper to mean the managers of in-house tax
departments and the person responsible for tax matters in those companies without such
departments.
7. For definitions provided in the questionnaire of ‘in-house tax department’, ‘reportable
geographical sector’, ‘tax’ and ‘tax work’, see Appendix 1.
8. Omitting to ask those responsible for tax matters in companies without in-house tax
departments to provide reasons for their answer was an oversight in the questionnaire
design.
9. Information on the cost of maintaining in-house tax departments and using external
expertise was directly requested in the questionnaire.  The cost of shadow tax
departments was derived indirectly.  The total of the direct costs of all companies with
in-house tax departments was divided by the total number of tax specialists (expressed in
man years) employed in these departments.  This generated a notional cost per tax
specialist.  An estimated cost of tax work performed by shadow tax departments was
obtained by multiplying the notional cost per tax expert by the number of persons
employed (expressed in man years) on tax work in the shadow tax departments.
10. Excluding a single outlier of £200 million.
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APPENDIX 1
Terms defined in the questionnaire
(i) In-house tax department:  A unit of at least one staff member who is employed full-
time within your organisation on tax matters.   Such a staff member is referred to as a
tax specialist.
(ii) Reportable geographical sector:  A geographical area comprising one or more
countries in which the company operates, or to which it supplies products or services,
for which financial information is required (by accounting standards) to be disclosed in
the company’s annual financial statements.
(iii) Tax:  Corporate income tax, value added tax, sales tax, customs duty, payroll taxes
and stamp duties.
(iv) Tax work:  All work related to the preparation and submission of tax returns and
planning the organisation’s tax liabilities.
